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SP - 107/76
23 June 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Lehman

SUBJECT: National Intelligence Steering Group

The following are general comments on the draft Memorandum of Understanding on the National Intelligence Steering Group:

a. In addition to the responsibilities contained in the Memorandum of Understanding, the Steering Group should assume cognizance over national intelligence production problems and issues which may or may not be related to a specific production proposal. For example, there are national intelligence production problems concerning Soviet civil defense and ASW. Also, the PFIAB complaints about NIE 11-3/8 might well have been handled by the Steering Group as a national intelligence production problem with implications for the intelligence community which go beyond the preparation of NIE 11-3/8. It is recommended that the draft Memorandum of Understanding be expanded to cover in very specific terms these additional responsibilities.

b. To be most effective, the Steering Group should not meet only to consider a specific production proposal. The NIO/SP, for example, will be submitting for the review of the Steering Group a six-month, or longer, program of interagency research projects. I recommend that the Steering Group encourage other NIOs to submit plans for interagency projects as far in advance as possible to permit it to review national intelligence production on more than a case-by-case basis. This would not preclude Steering Group review of the terms of reference and tasking plans for each production project.

c. It is not clear from the draft Memorandum of Understanding whether the production program of the WSSIC, STIC and JAEIC are to be reviewed by the Steering Group. I suggest that issuances of the DCI substantive intelligence committees be regarded as "Interagency National Production Below the NIE Level."

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d. The monitoring of the "national and departmental intelligence workload," as called for in the draft is nearly an impossible task under present administrative arrangements. There is simply no means for knowing what finished intelligence has been produced, let alone what is being planned for production (the attached memorandum SP-17/75, "Finished Intelligence on Strategic Programs," addresses the problem in more detail). The Steering Group might well undertake to establish a central register of finished intelligence as suggested in the attachment. However, notifying the Steering Group secretariat of projects involving research is not a feasible approach to establish such a register.

e. The section of the draft Memorandum of Understanding covering how the Steering Group would function calls for a very informal format for its activity. I believe the degree of formality in the functioning of the Steering Group will depend on how it implements its responsibilities. It is not clear from the draft Memorandum of Understanding exactly what the actual work of the Steering Group will be. If the NIOs have properly prepared and coordinated their terms of reference for interagency products and their production programs, the actual work of the Steering Group will likely be problem oriented. If the Steering Group reviews each detail of the terms of reference prepared under NIO auspices the Steering Group will in effect substitute for the coordination role which should be performed by the NIO. In any case, I recommend the section of the draft covering how the Steering Group will operate be made more general, allowing operating procedures to evolve as the functions of the Group become clearer.

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Assistant National Intelligence Officer
for Strategic Programs

Attachment:
SP-17/75 dtd 14 Feb 75

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Office of the Director

SP - 17/75
14 February 1975MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Assistant to the Deputy for National
Intelligence Officers

SUBJECT: Finished Intelligence on Strategic Programs

1. Attached is a bibliography of intelligence products on Soviet ICBMs. It shows that 424 finished intelligence products were issued during the period January 1973 to June 1974. An additional 64 articles in periodicals were listed because they were considered substantive rather than transient event reporting.

2. I am forwarding you this bibliography because I believe it dramatically demonstrates what I believe is a major managerial problem for the NIOs and the IC Staff. It required more than six months merely to compile the bibliography, which shows the lack of a central reference for intelligence products and the inadequacy of bibliographies maintained by many agencies. Compilation of lists of finished intelligence planned for production would be an even more difficult task.

3. I know you are aware that in attempting to oversee the production of intelligence, the NIOs and the IC Staff are missing a managerial mechanism for telling us what is planned for production and what has been produced. It is not only the NIOs and IC Staff who are disadvantaged. I believe we would introduce some production efficiencies merely by making intelligence managers at all levels aware of community-wide production programs.

4. It is possible that all of the some 500 reports on ICBMs listed in the bibliography might be attributed in one way or another as contributing to several KIJs dealing with ICBMs. I'm sure the candidate list of production responses to our present KIJs on ICBMs will be of lesser magnitude, but may still be too long for detailed analysis and evaluation.

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SUBJECT: Finished Intelligence on Strategic Programs

5. We are all aware of the lack of a system by which the DCI can manage intelligence community resources. In whatever form that system evolves, a mechanism for knowing what has been produced and what is planned for production would be a basic requirement. Therefore, action to establish such a mechanism now would not be lost motion.

6. I recommend that the D/DCI/NIO stimulate the establishment of a system for recording in a central location all finished intelligence produced and to be produced. This is a job which I believe should be undertaken by the IC Staff in collaboration with the ASD/I. I see this as a difficult task, one involving reporting problems, bureaucratic prerogatives and one which will probably raise more concerns than optimistic expectations on the part of intelligence managers. There will be fears that it will expose duplications, eliminate needed products, bring about central direction of intelligence production, provide a basis for Congressional reviews and will ultimately have resource implications. One-time efforts of this kind in the past raised just such concerns. In any case I believe the Intelligence Community must get on with the task.



Assistant National Intelligence Officer
for Strategic Programs

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